1059 
> 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS BULLETIN 

Vol. VII. FEBRUARY S 8, 1910 No. 36 

[Entered Feb. 14, 1902, at Urbana, 111., as second-class matter under Act of Congress July 16, 1894] 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 

BULLETIN NO. 2 

SOME FACTS IN PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION OF 

THE SO-CALLED DOGMA OF 

FORMAL DISCIPLINE 

Second (Revised) Edition 

BY 

STEPHEN S. COLVIN 
Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois 




URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION 



BULLETIN NO. 2 

SOME FACTS IN PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION OF 

THE SO-CALLED DOGMA OF 

FORMAL DISCIPLINE 

Second (Revised) Edition 

BY 

STEPHEN S. COLVIN 

Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois 




URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY 



•, \ 



,^^ 



t^ 



^A\ 



•Sli 



SOME FACTS IN PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
SO-CALLED DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 

I. Tlie Statement of the Problem 5 

11. Experimental Evidence Relating to the Problem . . 8 

III. Theoretical Discussions Relating to the Problem . . IT 

IV. The Possibility of Forming a Generalized Habit . . 23 

V. Rules for Securing Transfer 31 

VI. The Superior Disciplinary Value of Pure as Com- 
pared with Applied Science 33 



INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 

This paper substantially as printed was read before the Illi- 
nois School Masters' Club at Peoria, Oct. 8, 1909. On the follow- 
ing morning the question of formal discipline was discussed, Pres- 
ident David Felmlej of the Illinois State Normal University, 
leading- There seemed to be a substantial agreement that trans- 
fer of training was possible to a greater or less degree, and 
that it was best accomplished by making the habit set up a 
conscious end of action. President Felmley disagreed with the 
speaker of the previous evening chiefly on two points : (1) That 
a "generalized" habit was possible and (2) That pure science had 
a^ superior value to applied science. In the light of President 
Uelmley's discussion these two to])ics in the paper have been 
slightly amplified. Otherwise the paper is printed as read. 

University of Illinois, Nov. 15, 1909. 



PREFATORY STATEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION 

This second edition of Bulletin No. 2 of the School of Edu- 
cation, has been changed in some particulars from the first, prin- 
cipally by the addition of a section on Recent Theoretical Discus- 
sions Relating to the Problem of Formal Discipline. 

University of Illinois, April 15, 1910. 



I. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 

In the early years of the nineteenth century Gall and his pu- 
pil Spurzheim gave to the world the Anatomie et physlologie du 
systeme nerveiix, in which is to be found a detailed exposition of 
Gall's System of Phrenology. According to this system the brain 
is supposed to contain more than thirty separate and individual or- 
gans which are the seat of the most complex psychic capacities, 
or internal senses, such as combativeness, the fear-of-God, a sense- 
of-fact, the impulse-of-self-preservation, philoprogenitiveness, 
and the sense-of-language. It was only an incident to this system 
that the locality of these internal senses was found on the surface 
of the brain, and that the external evidence for them existed in 
certain prominences on the skull. The interest in this now biz- 
zarre theory lies as far as this discussion is concerned, in tlie 
fact that here we find in a most pronounced form two basal as- 
sumptions, one of which has served as a convenient vehicle for 
the justification of the dogma of formal discipline, while the 
other lies, in part at least, at the basis of the theories of those 
who in their reaction against this dogma have gone in the other 
direction to extremes which seem equally absurd and incapable 
of justification. The first of these assumptions is that the mind 
is composed of a number of separate faculties, and from this it 
readily followed that these can be educated in their entirety and 
made to serve in the various situations of life equally well for 
all purposes. The second assumption has looked up(m the va- 
rious activities of the nervous system, particularly of the cortex, 
as highly specialized and definitely localized, and has viewed tlie 
corresponding psychic functions as something quite discrete and 
separate. Carried to its logical extreme it would seem to 
imply that, for example, there is not only a cortical centre for 
language, but a distinct area for nouns, or for verbs, or what 
not; not only a cortical centre for vision, but a definite area for 
color; then why not for all the thirty-two thousand color quali- 
ties which the eye can sense? There seems to be no limit to the 
multiplication of centres which can result from such a theory, 
and it surely serves as a firm foundation for the doctrine that 
there is no education in general, and that the best we can do is to 
train the individual to interpret a certain number of definite 



6 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

sense stimuli and to respond to a limited number of concrete situ- 
ations in the same old way. The faculty psychology assumed a 
number of fabulous entities which worked out the destinies of the 
individual, while the doctrine of absolute localization of nervous 
function has made the brain a machine of relatively unrelated 
parts and has created a doctrine of psychic atomism which is as 
untrue as it is impossible of practical application. 

The faculty psychology of the last century is long since dead, 
and its resting place has almost been forgotten by the scientists of 
today ; its ghost, however, stalks abroad among the masses, and its 
spirit still lives in the pedagogical theories of many an uncritical 
thinker. From this faculty psychology it is no far cry to the 
dogma of formal discipline in all its purity. The assumptions it 
contains are well expressed by a clergyman quoted by Professor 
James in the first volume of his larger Psychology: '^As for my 
memory" writes the clergyman, "it has improved j-ear by year. . . . 
like a gymnast's muscle". This is a favorite comparison, the 
likening of memory, or attention or any other supposed psychic 
faculty to a muscle that can be developed for any use by any kind 
of exercise, and that is made equally strong by rowing, or boxing, 
or chopping wood, provided that the exercise is vigorous enough ; 
and having been made strong by one exercise, can be used equally 
well for all activities. No less a scientist than Helmholtz is quoted 
by Coover and AngelP as valuing particularly certain studies as a 
means of intellectual training, since these studies taxed "equally 
all the intellectual powers". Here we have the doctrine of form- 
al discipline and its pedagogical consequence expressed definitely 
and clearly. The implication of Helmholtz's assumption seems 
to be that there are definite mental powers and tliat these powers 
can be developed in all directions by certain well-chosen studies. 

Bagley in his Educative Process^ puts the matter concretely 
in this way; "Certain subjects of the curriculum, if properly pur- 
sued, were believed to develop what might be termed 'generalized' 
habits. For example, a pupil may acquire a specific habit of pro- 
ducing neat papers in arithmetic. The doctrine of formal disci- 
pline assumes that if this habit is once thoroughly established, 
it will function equally well in connection with language and 
drawing; that, functioning successfully here, it cannot fail to 

^American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XVIII, pages 328-340 (1907). 
'Chapter XTII, page 203. 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 7 

insure neatness of person and attire and that the habit of neat- 
ness thus ingrained upon the pupil will surely be carried into 
mature years." 

Thus it is assumed that there is a general faculty or habit of 
neatness, and that this when trained by one set of exercise, will 
be serviceable in all the specific situations in life where neatness 
may be employed. Stated thus the dogma of formal discipline is 
absolutely untenable. There is no general faculty of neatness, 
nor of any mental capacity, and if there were such an entity, 
training it to function in one direction would not mean that it 
is trained equally well to function in all directions. If there 
were nothing more to the doctrine of formal discipline than the 
old faculty psychology, or the thought that training in one direc- 
tion can be transferred equally well in all directions, I should 
not attempt even a partial justification of it here. It is quite 
obvious and beyond argument that training in mathematical 
reasoning does not necessarily mean ability to reason equally 
well in the affairs of every-day life; it seems certain that if I wish 
to increase my ability to discriminate between sliades of gray, the 
best training is to attempt such discriminations and not, for ex- 
ample, to practice discriminating between intensities of sound. 
It is a vastly different matter to afiirm, however, that training in 
mathematical reasoning has no effect on the other rational pro- 
cesses, and that as far as distinguishing shades of gray is con- 
cerned it is quite indifferent whether the person has had previous 
training in sensory discrimination in other fields. To affirm that 
when the mind is trained in one direction it is first of all trained 
in that direction and not in some other is one thing; to affirm, 
however, that the training in one direction has no influence in 
other directions is quite a different affair. No one, I think, would 
be quite so rash as to make the latter assertion ; but many would 
believe that such a transfer of training is in most instances 
slight, and in some cases such a transfer is not probable, even in 
the slightest degree. Some seem to assume that about all that 
education can hope to do is to give to the pupil certain facts in 
a limited department of knowledge, and to habituate him to defi- 
nite reactions in a circumscribed field of human activity. They 
seem to despair of any education in general that amounts to 
much. Having, however, admitted the possibility of transfer 
from one field to another, never mind how little, tliey are in- 
capable of determining a priori how great this transfer may be 



8 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

aucl what general effects it may have. Such persons may try to 
bring some definiteness into their conceptions as to the extent of 
this transfer by saying that such a transfer can take place only 
where there is a similar situation, and where like elements are 
involved; but it must be remembered that similarity and likeness 
are not primarily objective categories, but tlmt they are consti- 
tuted by the mind of the person who finds such similarity or like- 
ness, and that it is never certain beforehand just where tliis simi- 
larity and likeness is to be found. 

Such a contention can be determined only by actual tests 
either in life itself, or in the psycliological experiment. Fortu- 
nately we have had in the last few years a considerable number 
of such experiments reported, and the light which they throw on 
the wliole question of formal discipline is more illuminating than 
that which can be secured from a discussion of (/ priori assump- 
tions, or ^half-baked' psychological theories. I, therefore, turn to 
them and call the most important of them briefly to your atten- 
tion. 

II. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 

PROBLEM. 

The two pieces of experimental evidence which have probably 
had the most influence in discrediting the doctrine of formal dis- 
cipline and in over-empliasizing the opposite doctrine are tliose 
of Prof. James of two decades ago, and the more recent series in- 
spired by Prof. Thorndike of Columbia University. James in his 
chapter on Memory in the larger Psychology^ says: All improve- 
meut of memory consists, then, in the improvement of one's habit- 
ual methods of recording facts. By this he means to deny that 
there is any improvement in memory-power as such, the improve- 
ment being solely due to the method or the technique of memoriz- 
ing. He then gives in a footnote a description of certain tests 
carried on by himself in support of his assertion. Since these 
tests are the first of a considerable number of later experiments 
conducted in a similar way, I will venture here to give a brief 
description of their general nature. Like those that have been 
undertaken later by other investigators, the essential technique 
of these earliest experiments consisted in giving the subject of the 

'Vol. I, page 66". 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DLSCU'LINE 9 

test some material to learn, thereby determining his capacity for 
learning as measured by a certain standard. The material for 
this first learning constitutes what is termed the ''test series"; it 
is followed by a period of practice in learning some other kind of 
material and this second material is known as the "practice se- 
ries"; this practice series is then followed by another learning of 
the material of the test series, and the improvement or lack of 
improvement over the first trials gives a measure of the effect of 
the practice series on the ability to learn. 

To take a concrete case, James tested himself by learning on 
eight successive days 150 lines of Victor Hugo's 'Satyr.' He 
sayt^ : "The total number of minutes required for this was 131 5-(i 
— it should be said that I had learned nothing by heart for many 
years. I then, working for twenty-odd minutes daily, learned the 
entire first book of Paradise Lost, occupying 38 consecutive days 
in the process". He then went back to the learning of Victor 
Hugo and found that while before the training he had learned at 
the rate of one line in 50 seconds, after the training he learned 
at the slower rate of one line in 57 seconds. James added that 
during the second learning series he was perceptibly fagged with 
other work, which, of course, invalidated the entire experiment. 

Other persons under Professor James' direction carried on 
similar experiments under somewhat better conditions and the 
results showed a slight positive effect of the training. 

These experiments are today chiefly of historical interest. 
They were not carried on under the strictest experimental condi- 
tions and are valuable mainly as pioneer investigations in the 
field. They are important also because their conclusions were 
given to the world with the tremendous authority that the ip.se 
(Ji.rit of their author has always carried. Thus they have done 
much to reform the entire notion of tlie ])<)ssibilities of memory- 
training and of training in general. 

The second set of experiments whicli I have mentioned above 
as liaving had an important pedagogical couseciuence are those of 
Tliorndike and Woodworth^ reported under tlie title. The Influ- 
ence of Improvement in One Mental Function upon the Efficien- 
cy of Other Functions. Tests were conducted to determine the 
influence of the training in the estimation of magnitudes on the 
ability to estimate magnitudes of the same general sort; the influ- 

'Fsyclwlouical Rcviczv. Vol. VIII, pages 247-261; 3-I8-395 ; 55.3-564- 



10 UNIVERSITY OP ILLINOIS 

euce of training in estimating weiglit.s, on the ability to estimate 
the weight of miscellaneous objects of similar weight; and the in- 
fluence of the practice in marking words containing certain let- 
ters on the marking of words C(mtaining other letters, misspelled 
ANords, et cetera. 

In these varied tests most of the subjects showed some im- 
provement when tested after the practice series. Thorndike's 
general conclusion is that while there is simie transfer it is not 
due to any ''mysterious transfer of practice, to an uuanalyzable 
property of mental functions", but rather to a transfer of identi- 
cal elements from the practice series to the final test series. This 
transfer on the Avhole does not seem to be great, and its spread is 
limited largely to activities that closely resemble one another. 
Thorndike's experiments have been criticized as giving results in 
part at variance with his conclusions, and as lacking entirely in 
introspective analysis, making it difficult to interpret the true 
significance of the numerical results. 

Another experimental study which seems to point in part to 
the same general conclusious as those of Thorndike and Wood- 
worth was conducted also at Columbia University by Bair.'' This 
experimenter made an extensive investigation and analysis of the 
practice curve. The writer, however, concludes that ^'auy bit of 
special training also helps us to receive training in general. Any 
training helps us to find ourselves. It gives us a method of orien- 
tation which leaves us in our reactions not entirely at the mercy 
of chance even in unfamiliar situations. The experience whicli 
we get from special training gives us a general i3ower to meet an 
entirely new situation with a more favorable response than had 
we not had this special training". 

Among the earlier experiments, the transfer of training fr(»m 
one specific set of reactions to another was investigated under 
the direction of Scripture in the psychological laboratory at Yale 
University*''. The first series of experiments considered the in- 
crease of muscular steadiness through practice in inserting a 
needle in a very small hole, and the transfer of this increase to the 

^Columbia University, Contributions to Philosophy. Psychology and Ednca 
tion, Vol. IX (1902). 

'On the education of muscular control and power, E. W. Scripture, T. T.. 
Smith, and Emily M. Brown, Studies from the Yale Psychological Laboratory. 
Vol. II, pages 105-114 (1894). Also research in cross-education by Walter \V. 
Davis; ibid. Vol. VI, pages 6-50 (1898) and VIII, pages 64-109 (1900). 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 11 

corresponding muscles of the opposite half of the body. The left 
hand was tested first and showed 50 per cent of correct trials, but 
after practice with the right hand for ten days the left hand 
showed 76 per cent of successes. Scripture explains tliese results 
as due primarily to a training of the attention rather than to any 
carrying over of skill in adjustment. Experiments on the in- 
crease of muscular power after practice showed "a steady in- 
crease in tlie muscular power of the right hand due to practice 
and also an increase in the power of the left hand due to what 
might be called 'indirect practice' ". 

Further experiments conducted by Davis under Scripture's 
direction on the rapidity of tapping a telegraph key, showed im- 
provement through practice not only for^he part of the body 
practiced but for other members as well. Experiments in 
strength of voluntary effort in lifting dumbells sJiowed a trans- 
ferrence of the effects of practice from the right to tiie left arm 
in muscular development and endurance. Experiments in lung- 
ing at a target with a fencer's foil showed that practice with the 
right hand affected the left hand positively. According to Davis 
the results of the experiments showed not only that effects of 
exercise may be transferred, but also that "will power and at- 
tention are educated by physical training and tliat wlien devel- 
oped by any special act they are developed for all otlier acts". 

Later Judd^ carried on a series of exi)eriments on the effect 
of practice without knowledge of results. 

The person tested was required to judge the length of certain 
lines and he was seated in such a position that his right hand 
and arm were entirely hidden from view by a large screen. What- 
ever lie did with his right hand was, therefore, unseen by Iiim. 
''On the left side of the screen and in full view, nine different lines 
were shown in succession, and he was required to place a pencil 
held in tlie unseen right hand in the direction indicated by the 
several lines seen before him." After this the reactor was given 
''fuller visual experience" with one line and an improvement at 
once took place in regard to this line. This improvement was 
found to be transferred by later tests to the other lines, but in 
some instances this transfer was negative. The lines that in tlie 



'These experiments are reported in the Psycholoqical Revien', Vol. IX, pages 
27-30 (1902); also in a symposium on formal discipline in the Educational Re- 
viezv, June, 1908. 



12 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

original series liad shown an error similar to that of the line with 
which fuller visual experience had been obtained, showed a posi- 
tive improvement in the test series, those in which the error had 
been in an opposite direction grew worse. In both cases, how- 
ever, there were clear evidences of a transfer effect, but in the 
second case the transfer was negative. 

In a second series of tests, geometrical figures were compared. 
Because of an illusion, one of these was overestimated, another 
underestimated. During the experiment one observer was kept 
in ignorance of the results, while the other was fully informed. 
Then the figures were reversed and a second series of tests were 
begun. In this the observer who knew the effect of practice ad- 
justed himself to the new conditions. The other observer who did 
not know the effects showed a greater error than at any time, and 
was unable to improve, because, as Judd believes, the habit had 
now become so firmly fixed that training could no longer modify 
the reaction. 

A similar test was later carried on with school children, who 
were required to hit a target placed under water. This was diffi- 
cult because of the deflection of the light through refraction. In 
the test one group was instructed in the nature of refraction, 
while the others were kept in ignorance. The boys in this test who 
had been instructed did no better than the others, but in a second 
test in which the depth of the target in the water was reduced 
from twelve inches to four, the boys who had the theory fitted 
themselves quickly to the new conditions, while with the other 
group the errors were large and persistent. These experiments 
clearly show the value of a knowledge of conditions in connection 
with the transfer of training. 

A somewhat analogous fact is brought out by Ruediger in a 
test reported in the Educational Rcvirw^ for November, 1908. 
Ruediger's experiment was suggested by Bagley's results^ with 
children tested at the Montana State Normal College. Bagley 
attempted "to determine whether the habit of producing neat 
papers in arithmetic will function with reference to neat written 
work in other studies". He states that "the results are almost 
startling in their failure to show the slightest improvement in 
language and spelling papers, although the improvement in the 

'Improvement of mental functions through ideals. 
^Thc Educative Process, Chap. XIII, page 208. 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 13 

arithmetic papers was noticeable from the first." Ruediger's tests 
vrere carried on for eight weeks in three different schools, all with 
pupils in the seventh grade. He found that when the emphasis 
on neatness in one subject was accompanied by talks to pupils on 
neatness, so that the habit was raised to clear consciousness, de- 
cided improvement was shown in subjects no more closely re- 
lated than geography, arithmetic, grammar, and history. In other 
words, the habit was constructed into an ideal and a transfer was 
thus made which seemed entirely lacking when the whole pro- 
cedure was on the level of the subconscious. This matter will be 
brought up again in a later part of the discussion. 

Another important series of experiments on transfer was 
condiicted a few years ago by Coover and AngelP*^ on the general 
practice effects of special exercises. In one experiment the train- 
ing series consisted in the discrimination of sound intensities, the 
test series in discriminating shades of gray. A clear transfer of 
the practice effect was shown, as was also the case in a lesser de- 
gree in a second test in which the training series consisted in 
sorting cards and the test series in typewriter reactions. The 
authors conclude from the objective results and the introspections 
of the subjects that the improvement consists in "divesting the 
essential process of the unessential factors. There is a greater 
habituation and more economical adaptation of attention." 

Rennett reports the results of an experimejit conducted at the 
Teaclier's College (Columbia University) with sixteen children 
to determine the effect of discriminating between shades of blue, 
on the subsequent ability to discriminate lietween shades of other 
colors and of black. Decided transfer effects were indicated. 

Franker^ ^ recently carried on a series of experiuients on the 
transference of training in the psychological laboratorv of the 
State University of Iowa. Tlie same general methods in the use 
of training and practice series were employed as in the previous 
experiments cited. 

The training series consisted in memorizing the order of four 
tones. Tlie test series were eight in number as follows: (1) 
memory for poetry; (2) memoi'y for the order of four shades of 
gray; (3) memory for tlie order of nine tones; (4) memory for 
the order of nine siiades of gray; (5) memory for the order of 

'^"American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XVIII, pages 328-340 (1907). 
"T/;^ Psychologcial Review, Monograph Supplements, Vol. IX, No. 2, pages 
56-102. 



14 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

four tones; (fi) memory for the order of nine ji;eometrical figures; 
(7) memory for the order of nine numbers; (8) memory for the 
extent of arm movement. Clear indication of transfer was found, 
generally more marked in those cases where the test series and 
the practice series were similar, although it sometimes happened, 
as in Thorndike's experiments, that improvement was not noted in 
some cases where there was great similarity between the practice 
and test series; indeed, the practice seemed to have a negative ef- 
fect. The results of the experiment did not, however, support 
Thorndike's contention that "improvement in any single mental 
function rarely brings about equal improvement in any other 
function, no nuitter how similar". In many cases Franker found 
that improvement was absolutely greater in amount in the test 
than in the training series. During the experiment the intro- 
spections of the observers were carefully recorded and they indi- 
cate that mental inuigery and properly controlled attention have 
much to do with the transfer. 

Another investigation of some importance in clearly in- 
dicating the existence of transfer is that of Winch^^ who gave his 
observers as a test series, the learning of selections from an his- 
torical reader and as a training series the committing of poetry. 
]More than one hundred cliildren were tested. The investigator 
concludes that ''improvement gained l)y practice in memorizing 
one subject of instruction, is transferred to the memory v,ork in 
other subjects whose nature is certainly diverse from that in 
whicli tlie improvement was gained". Rote memory can certainly 
be improved. 

Among minor investigations and observations bearing more 
or less directly on the problem may be mentioned Volkmaun's^'^ 
tests of a half century ago on the inlluence of practice on spatial 
discrimination. He investigated the fineness of space discrimi- 
nation on the skin by means of the Weber compass and found 
that practice with the finger tips of the left hand increased the 
fineness of discrimination of the finger tips of the right hand, 
but not of the left fore-arm. Practice with the third phalanx in- 
creased the fineness of discrimination on the first phalanx. 

Also of interest are the investigations of T^rbantschisch, of 
Epstein and of Vogt cited by Coover and AngelP^. T'rbantsch- 

"Brifish Journal of Psychology, Vol. II, page 284. 
"Bericht d. k. sacks. Ges. d. Wissenchaft, 1858. 
"Op. cit. page 328. 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 15 

iscli found that a sound stimulus increased the sensitivity of the 
subject for visual, gustatory, olfactory and tactile stimuli. Sim- 
ilar results are repcjrted by Epstein in regard to the relation be- 
tween auditory and visual stimuli. Vogt showed that habitua- 
tion to distractions in one situation could be carried over to other 
fields. 

A piece of work bearing less directly on the questi«m of trans- 
fer, but yet indicating something in regard to mental correlations 
w liich may be variously interpreted, was recently conducted at the 
University of Illinois by H. L. Rietz and Imogene Shade^"'. This 
concerned itself with inquiring into ''the facts of correlation be- 
tween the efficiency of students in mathematics and their efficien- 
cy in (1) foreign languages, (2) natural science''. The metliod of 
investigation may be characterized in a general way as tliat of Gal- 
ton and Pearson. Tlie source of tlie data is the rec<u'ds of the Reg- 
istrar of the T^niversity of Illinois. The results of the investiga- 
tion are, in brief, tliat "a high correlation exists between efficiency 
in mathematics and foreign languages''. While the results liere 
do not in any way indicate whether there has been a transfer of 
training in mathematics to the otlier subjects, they seem to sliow 
that studies as far apart as mathematics and foreign language 
evidently have many points in common, so that training in one 
subject might very well be made effective in tlie otlier. Otlier 
experiments in correlation between various studies have been 
carried on with various results, none of them, however, furnishing 
any conclusive evidence in favor of or against the possibility of 
transfer. 

I have reserved for consideration until the last, one of the 
most extensive and important series of experiments relating to the 
question of transfer of training^^', namely those of Ebert and 
Meumann. These tests, though with a greatly improved tech- 
nique and with a larger number of subjects, are in general like 
the pioneer investigations conducted by James. The results, 
however, are decidedly different and the conclusions arrived at 
by Meumann are on the whole at variance with those of James. 
At the beginning of the ^Meumann tests, the memories of the 
subjects were determined for nonsense syllables, numbers, let- 

'"'Correlation of efficiencj^ in mathematics and efficiency in other subjects. The 
University of Illinois Studies, Vol. VI, No. lo, (1908). 
^\4rch. f. d. gcsamte Psychol., Vol. IV. 



16 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

ters, one-syllabled substantives, Italian words, poetic words, prose 
words, and visual si«;ns. In the training series whicli followed, 
the subjects were given nonsense syllables to memorize and then 
the original test series was repeated to determine improvement, 
if any, both for immediate recall and for permanent retention. 
In some cases the experiment was carried still farther, a second 
training series followed by another test series being introduced. 
The special training with nonsense syllables evidently increased 
the ability of the subjects to memorize and retain the materials 
of the test series. The amount of tlie transfer was found to 
be great. The ability to memorize philosophic prose, for ex- 
ample, sliowed an increase of 70 per cent after the practice se- 
ries, and to memorize visual signs, 55 per cent. Ebert and Meu- 
mann consider that increased power of attending, increase in vol- 
untary effort, improvement in the technique of learning and gen- 
eral decrease in discomfort and tediousness are the chief auxiliary 
causes for the improvement after practice. They believe, how- 
ever, that beyond these conditions and fundamental to the process 
of transfer, lies a sympathetic interaction of allied memory func- 
tions, based on an assumed psycliophysical activity. Tlie exist- 
ence of such an uncertain relationship is denied by the reviewers 
of this piece of work. Both Miiller and Dearborn, who have criti- 
cized these experiments, believe that the transfer can be best ex- 
plained by considering the so-called auxiliary aids as the .s'o/r 
cause of the results obtained. Be this as it may, Ebert and Meu- 
maun, experienced investigators of high standiug, have found 
that so mechanical a procedure as memorizing nonsense syllables 
has a yu'onounced effect on learning in general. Whatever the 
explanation may be, the results seem beyond reasonable dispute, 
botli on account of the ability of the investigators and the un- 
equivocal nature of their findings. 

I have spent, jtcrliaps, an undue amount of time in attem])t- 
ing to present the above experimental evidence. It has been my 
wisli, however, to avoid as much as possible, speculation, hypothe- 
sis, and conjecture, and get down to the basis of undoubted facts. 
Tliere can be no dispute, I think, in regard to the significance of 
these facts. Transfer is indicated in practically all of the experi- 
ments, and in some, particularhf in the last descrihcd, this transfer 
is striJ{iii(/. Tlie only investigations which showed no transfer 
were those of James, performed admittedly under unsatisfactory 
conditions, and the tests of Bagley in the Montana Normal 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 17 

School. Bagley's experiments, however, when coutiniied under 
somewhat different conditions, as conducted by Ruediger, show 
clear evidence of transfer. Of tlie remaining important experi- 
ments those of Thorndike show the least positive result.^" 

I take it that in the light of all the evidence there cannot be 
the slightest donbt that practice effects may be, and generally are, 
transferred from one set of activities to another. The extent of 
such transfer and the conditions under which it takes place are, 
however, matters for further investigation and of great pedagogi- 
cal significance. Whether the results are due to transfer of iden- 
tical elements (Thorndike) ; to improvement of habitual methods 
of recording facts (James) ; to training the attention and will- 
power (Scripture and Davis) ; to divesting the essential process 
of the unessential factors, greater habituation and more economic- 
al adaptation of attention (Coover and Angell) ; to the effective 
use of mental imagery and properly controlled attention (Frank- 
er) ; to the development of ideals (Bagley and Ruediger) ; to 
general improvement in technique of learning, attention and 
will-power, but chiefly to a smypathetic interaction of allied mem- 
ory functions (Ebert and Meumann), or to some other factors as 
yet not analyzed out, may still be a matter of investigation and 
debate. My own personal opinion is that practically all of these 
are more or less important elements in the transfer. 

III. RECENT THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS RELATING 
TO THE PROBLEM. 

Among recent theoretical discussions of the question of trans- 
fer f)f training may be mentioned, first a symposium on formal 
discipline by Professor J. R. Angell of the University of Chicago; 
Professor W. B. Pillsbury of the University of Michigan, and 
Professor C. H. Judd of the University of Chicago. This sym- 
posium was given at a meeting of the Michigan Schoolmasters' 
Club in Ann Arbor, April 2, 1908, and subsequently published in 
the Educatioual Rccieio for June 1008. 

Angell summarized his discussion as follows: (1) Certain 

"Wallin reports in the March number of the Journal of Experimental Psychol- 
ogy for the current year that practice with one eye in illusions of reversible per- 
spective is clearly transferred to the unpracticed eye; likewise practice effects are 
transferred from the fovea to the peripheral retina. 



18 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

1) a bits <>aiuecl in the mastery of one study may be appropriated 
directly in another; they may (2) be slightly modified before 
siu'li ap])licati()n, and still show fen' their possessor a great gain 
as c{mi])ared with the individual who has to start from the be- 
ginning. (3) These habits may be incorporated in larger habit 
groups either with or without slight modification. (4) They 
may tend to impede certain antagonistic habits, and in turn be 
impeded by other previously extant and inhibitory habits. (5) 
But in all these eases, the instances of inhibition as well as those 
of reinforcement and incorporation, it seems probable that a cer- 
tain gain in the power to use and sustain attention will accrue 
from any purposeful and persistent intellectual application * * * 

* *. (6) What subjects best reinforce one another; Avhat ones 
most inevitably conflict with one another; whether these rela- 
tions are dependent upon the mode of presentation, rather than 
upon the subject-matter itself, these and other similar questions, 
too numerous to point out, must one and all l>e answered by ex- 
periment and experience. Dogmatism is wholly impossible in 
advance of such drastic and exhaustive investigation". 

Pillsbury concludes that 'with memory, in the usual logical 
learning the factors involved are in a large measure common to 
memories of all related subjects. You can not be sure that any 
fact is absolutely unrelated to any other, and so far as they are 
related, learning the one makes easier learning the other. * * * * 

* * Training one part thus trains related parts, and the whole in 
some degree ******* go the man with well-rounded training 
is pro1)ably on the average better trained fcu' learning in any field 
than the untrained man, or even than the nmn with a narrow edu- 
cation in any other field." 

Judd concludes his paper as follow^s: 

"Does nature-study train in observation? Does washing of 
slates train in neatness? Does saying good-morning to the prin- 
cipal conduce to good manner on the playground? If there is 
any dogmatic answer given you when you ask these questions, 
put it aside. There is no single answer to any one of these ques- 
tions ******* ^Yp ij^j^y ji^ake our pu])ils eager seekers after 
truth, or we may make them bigoted little dogmatists. What 
Ave do will depend very much upon wdiat we and our interests are. 
If we believe in specialized functions we shall probably do very 
little to generalize knowledge in our students. If, on the other 
hand, we have broad views of the subject we are teaching and of 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 19 

our task in teaching it, we shall find very little in practical ex- 
perience to bind us to the narrow view that mental life is made 
up of watertight compartments''. 

A second symposium on formal discipline b}' Professors E. 
B. Delabarre, E. N. Henderson and H. H. Home, was presented 
before the Brown University Teachers' Association at Providence, 
April 3, 1909 and published in Education for May of the same 
year. Professor Delabarre in his article distinguishes between the 
content, and the formal aspects of consciousness and maintains 
that ''no individual can, by his own unaided efforts, acquire any 
large number of essentially^ reliable forms". No one can enum- 
erate all the important formal elements. ''It must be a part of 
the task of educational theory to learn Avhat they are; to distin- 
guish between those that are desirable and true and those that 
are unreliable". The writer concludes that "these formal elements 
can be taught; that one subject unquestionably helps in the learn- 
ing of others; that there are disciplinary subjects that are of 
especial value for this purpose; that not only does good training 
in any subject improve methods of learning, of attention, of work, 
of comprehension ; but it is also true that all knowledge possess- 
es some elements in common and the number of these may be very 
considerable even in the case of subjects that appear at first sight 
little related". 

Henderson in his discussion reviews the experimental work 
on the transfer of training, and concludes that it is difficult to 
determine whether discipline in form or discipline in content is 
more valuable. Training in each is possible. 

Horne is his discussion maintains that "present study helps 
us in the later situation in so far as common features are involved. 
* * * * There are no subjects which give an 'all round mental train- 
ing', for no such training is possible". 

Professor Alexander ]\reikeljohn in a paper read before the 
New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools at 
Boston University, October 9, 1908, and published in the Educa- 
tional Review for February 1900, approaches the problem of form- 
al discipline from the standpoint of the logician. He defines 
formal training as "discipline in certain discoverable forms of in- 
tellectual activity. It does not imply the bad psychology of the 
faculties, it does imply the thoroughly sound and respectable 
distinction of form and content which is made by the logician". 
The writer concludes that "it is one of the tasks of education to so 



20 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

train the mind that it may do well the work of thinking. In 
order to accomplisli tliis, it must .sehn-t those kinds of mental ac- 
tivity whicli seem most fundamental and important for the life of 
the student"/; 

W. O. Ivuediger in a recent volume on the Principles of Edu- 
cation, devotes considerable space to the discussion of formal 
discipline. While not taking a positive position either for or 
against transfer of training, he maintains that the evidence de- 
duced concerning such transfer ''does not argue for an inde- 
pendence and discreteness of mental functions, but for an inter- 
dependence and interrelation of such functions. This being true, 
we should expect not only that one function will assist another 
somewhat related function, but that under ditferent conditions 
the first would interfere with the second. ******** The 
channels through which improvement is carried from one mental 
function to another may apparently all be grouped together un- 
der the head of 'identical elements' * * * * *As a means of trans- 
fer this is easily comprehensible and removes all mystery from 
the process. It, however, is frequently difficult to tell when two 
processes are mentally identical, and when they are not. An 
apparent resemblance or divergence nuiy prove misleading when 
subjected to test ***** If we have analyzed the doctrine of 
formal discipline correctly, it is evident that its extreme advo- 
cates, and its extreme opponents are both wrong. Knowledge 
and training are not merely specific in their application, but they 
also have a general value''. 

The various writers above cited in general find no little value 
in a modified statement of the dogma of formal discipline. W. 
H. Heck, on the other hand, in a recently published monograph 
on "Mental Discipline and Educational Values" takes an oi)posite 
position, although not denying the clearly established fact of trans- 
fer of training. Heck believes that the doctrine of formal disci- 
pline is at present doing much harm in educational theory and 
practice, and he gives as the main pur]K)se of his essay the effort 
to modify the doctrine, and "upon a modification, to establish a 
standard of educational values". Tlie doctrine "continues to 
make itself felt fhroughout our school system and * * * the oppo- 
sition to it is disorganized, timid and bookish", asserts the writer 
in his introductory chapter, but later on he says that there is a 
"popular demand for more practical" courses in schools * * * * 
* * * The doctrine of formal discipline is retiring from the ele- 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 21 

iiientary scbools, and is showing signs of increasing discomfort in 
the secondary schools". Further, "the adherents of the doctrine 
of formal discipline shrink from carrying their doctrine to its 
logical conclusions", while "the business and professional world 
relies more and more on the superiority of specialized ability re- 
sulting from specialized training. Men are thereby becoming 
more efficient specialized workers, but less adaptable, less trans- 
ferable, more dependent upon the specialized demand for their 
work." 

The "timid opposition" to the dogma of formal discipline does 
not seem to be so ineffectual as the writer at first would lead us to 
believe. Indeed, from his own statement of conditions, it seems 
legitimate to inquire whether in the theoretical and practical re- 
action against the dogma of formal discipline, we have not already 
gone too far in the opposite direction. Are we not at present con- 
fronted rather by the danger of giving up our ideas of a general 
education, and becoming adherents of the dogma of speci-fic train- 
ing? 

Heck in liis arguments against the doctrine of formal discipline 
does not attempt in the light of the experimental evidence which 
he reviews, to deny the possibility of transfer. He rather tries to 
sliow tliat this result is not brought about through the transfer 
of skill in a specific activity or ability, but by the development of 
general concepts of methods which may be applied to various sit- 
uations and by tlie employment of common elements in various 
specific activities- 

Thus the writer is in substantial agreement with the conclu- 
sions reached by several investigators cited above; yet the general 
impression lie conveys is that the whole present attitude in regard 
to the possibility of formal training is wrong and dangerous. It 
sliould, however, be remembered that while many who still hold 
to a belief in transfer of training do so from the standpoint of 
an exploded psychological theory, and that while it is extremely 
important to determine the exact nature of the transfer process 
from the standpoint of psycliological theory, tliis determination 
is of relatively less significance from the standpoint of educational 
practice The essential fact remains for the educator to consider 
tliat ira'niing in one actiriti/ docs help the performitnee of ettJier 
actiritiefi. For this reason it would be a gTeat misfortune to con- 
vey the belief generally that because the doctrine of formal disci- 
pline may be wrong in certain of its tlieoretical aspects, tlie prac- 



22 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

tkal eft'ect of learuiug iii one tield upon learning in another 
is )iiL Such a belief would do more harm to educational theory 
and |)i'artice than any number of academic psychological heresies 
(even that of the old "faculty psychology") could possibly effect. 

I feck's chief arguments against formal disci ])line are based 
not on ex})erimental evidence, but on certain theoretical assump- 
tions. In the first pJace, he overstates tlie doctrine of formal dis- 
cipline as it would be held todaj^ by any one whose opinion is 
of value or influence. 

"The doctrine of formal discipline implies that the mind is 
made up or possessed of certain general powers or faculties. . . . 
Development in strength, breadtli, accuracy, etc., of the power in- 
\ olved can be used in response to any other stimulus than the one 
by which the power was previously exercised, with little change 
in nature or diminution in amount." 

In the first place, no one will attempt to say in any undeter- 
mined case whether the exchange by transfer shall be slight or 
large, and further as a matter of fact the much abhorred "faculty 
psychology" of our fathers is not basal to a belief in the transfer 
of mental training. Naturall}' Avhen the doctrine was first formu- 
lated, it was stated in terms of the psychology then current. It 
could have been stated in terms of up-to-date functional psychol- 
ogy almost as well. This seems to be the common mistake that 
the opponents of transfer generally make, namely the assumption 
that because the doctrine of formal discipline first appeared in 
the setting of the faculty psychology, it must of necessity be in- 
validated with the passing of that psychology. With e(iual justi 
fication from logic, one might argue that because the belief in 
heaven was originally coupled with the old Ptolemaic conception 
of the universe, this belief was destroyed when the Copernican 

system superceded the older cosmological ideas. 

A second theoretical objection wliich Heck finds to the doc- 
trine of formal discipline is that it is not c()m])atible with the cur- 
rent theories of localization of nervous function. Heck holds 
that "for every particular state of consciousness there is a con- 
concomitant stimulation of particular grou])s of cells in the cere- 
bral cortex." In other words, he seems to adoi)t a theor}' of abso- 
lute localization, although he recognizes the fact that "cortical 
activity is not limited to these particular groups of cells in rela- 
tion to a particular state of consciousness, for consciousness at 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 23 

any moment is related to an equilibrium of activity in the cortex 
as a whole." 

Heck appears to be here on the horns of a dilemma. If he 
denies the possibility of formal discipline on the ground of a nar- 
rowly interpreted theory of nervous localization, he is basing his 
contention on a hypothesis that not only has behind it no verifiable 
facts, but also is in conflict with what is known concerning the 
nature of conscious processes. If, on the other hand, we accept a 
view of relative localization, which more nearly accords with the 
known neurological facts, and with the activities of consciousness, 
there is nothing in this latter view which precludes the possibility 
of a very general transfer of practice effects. In short, if we 
tr}' to overthrow the doctrine of transfer on the ground of absolute 
localization of nervous functions, we are doing so on dubious theo- 
retictil grounds and holding to a theory wliicli runs counter to 
what we know of mental elements and mental organization. If, 
on tlie otlser hand, we accept the doctrine of relative rather than 
absolute localization, of colligation of remote functional areas, 
and of vicarious functioning (as does Wundt), we find that such 
an hypothesis, instead of making against the possibility of trans- 
fer, gives a clear basis and reason for such transfer. Indeed, a 
rational hypothesis of cerebral localiz.ition suggests cooperation 
and transfer of the widest possible sort. 

In the third place. Heck bases his opposition to the doctrine 
of formal discipline on the assertion, so commonly made, that 
liabits are specific and that a generalized habit is impossible. 
This point of view is so generally accepted and its theoretical 
and practical bearings so important that I have devoted a special 
and practical bearings are so important that I have devoted a spe- 
cial section in this discussion to the consideration of the question. 

IV. THE POSSIBILITIES OF FORMING A GENERALIZED 

HABIT. 

Those who deny the possibility of a "'generalized" habit assert 
that habit by its very nature must be specific. As Bagley puts it, 
"A simple habit is a specific response to a specific stimulus; a 
generalized habit would be a specific response to a number of 
different stimuli." As such, "the term is a psychological absurd- 
ity." In a similar vein Thorndike asserts that "the mind is on 
its dynamic side a machine for making partiruJar reaction.'^ to 
particular fiituatio)is. It works in great detail, adapting itself to 



24 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

special data of which it has liad experience." The case seems very 
simple. A habit is a definite response to a definite stimulus, and 
as all training tends to the formatiim of liabits, there can be no 
training that is not specific. This line of reasoning might seem 
all very well if it did not prove too much. If habit is of this de- 
cidedly specific character, then it would seem to follow of necessity 
that the aim of the process of learning is merely to make facile 
and subconscious those things which have already been done after 
ji fasliion, and not to prepare the individual properly to react to 
essentially new situations. If this were the case we should be in 
a sorry plight indeed. We should be obliged to revise all our 
former notions of an education, and substitute for our present 
procedure a narrow and illiberal training, habituating the pupil 
to a limited sphere of predetermined activities. The child would 
be but little better off, then, in his learning processes than is the 
brute, who manifestly is trained in just sucli a manner as de- 
scribed and in no sense educated. Thorudike attempts to es- 
cape from til is obvious difficulty bv admitting the transfer of 
training through elements identical in two situations. 

Such a transfer in the simplest form is well illustrated by a 
series of experiments carried on several years ago in the psycholog- 
ical laboratory of the University of Illinois. In these experi- 
ments three dogs, among other animals, were tested in regard to 
their ability to discriminate between various colors. Throughout 
most of the experiments a standard red was the color wliich they 
were trained to associate with the obtaining of food. This color 
was painted on the food-box, and the dogs soon formed the habit 
of reacting directly to this red-box stimulus, thus obtaining tlieir 
food. Later one of the dogs was tested to see how far he could as- 
sociate the color red when presented not merel}' on a box of a cer- 
tain size and appearance but on various receptacles and under 
various conditions, with the obtaining of food. Gradually tliis 
dog was trained to recognize the color red, wlien thus i)resented, 
as the food signal. Thus, quite mechanically, he seems to liave 
transferred his habit from one situation to another througii the 
identity of the color element in the various situations. Sucli a 
transfer is not of a high type, nor is it very promising from the 
standpoint of educational procedure. Tlie possibilities of getting 
much general training through the identity of objective elements 
in a total situation do not seem to be great. It sliould be stated, 
however, that Thorndike understands by identical elements not 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 25 

only identity of objective stimulus as in the case of the food- 
box stimulus, but the identity of those elements that constitute 
the reaction to a stimulus, the identity of adjustment in two sit- 
uations. 

Bagiey has avoided the difficulty by emphasizing the iden- 
tity or similarity of certain subjective elements in a situation 
(indeed he would define a situation in terms of conscious 
meaning rather than in terms of objective elements) in his 
doctrine of a transfer through the creation of ideals. He says 
in regard to the habit of neatness, for example, that "those who 
appear to carry this habit over from one department of life to 
another really carry over the ideal of neatness." The importance 
of this general principle, thus formulated by Bagiey, cannot be 
overestimated, yet I am inclined to believe that neither this, nor 
the principle of identical elements as set forth by Thorndike is 
sufficient to explain all there is in the transfer, nor to exhaust the 
possibilities of a general training. 

In several senses I believe that we are warranted in speaking 
of a generalized habit. Such an expression seems to me admis- 
sible under the following conditions: 

(1.) When the specific stimulus that calls forth a specific re- 
action is common to a large variety of situations, which situations 
may have little in common beyond the presence in each of tlie spe- 
cific stimulus. In tlie case of the food-box reaction, for example, 
described above the color red was the element in many situa- 
tions whic!i [)rodu<ed under varying circumstances the food-seek- 
ing response. Such a reaction would be general in the sense that 
it could take place under many objective conditions, and thus as far 
as the environment is concerned, constitute a generalized re- 
sponse through the similarity or identity of a single element in 
that environment. Take another example of a similar sort: The 
soldier who has learned to come to attention at tlie word of com- 
mand will do so on the parade ground, the battlefield, or the street. 
It, of course, may be said that for the soldier who so responds the 
actual situation is the same under these varying conditions. 
However, this is true onh^ as far as the dominant element in the 
situation remains similar, this dominant element being deter- 
mined not by its objective importance to the ordinary observer, 
but by the fact that tlie soldier does thus react under various 
circumstances (the reaction thus being the criterion of identity 
of stimulus). For the ordinary observer, however, this dominant 



2G UNIVERSITY or ILLINOIS 

element may be of but slight importuuee, aiul thus iu his rekitious 
\\ith his I'ellowmen, the sohlier may appear to have acciuired a 
generalized habit, and for all ])ractical purposes his reaetiim may 
be treated as such. 

(2.) There is another class of habitual reactions which do 
not seem to be called forth b\' any definite objective stimulus, but 
which ap])ear under a large variety of objective conditions in 
which no single common element can be found. These latter cases 
arise when the reaction is under the dominance of a mood or emo- 
tion that so colors the objective environment that several different 
stimuli may call forth the habitual response. A person, for ex- 
ample, of a choleric dis])osilion may have established a very defi- 
nite set of reactions which habitually expresses his angry moods. 
The insignificant external causes which set off this definite re- 
sponse may vary greatly, and it may thus be urged, that not one 
stimulus, but many, are capable of producing the reaction. In 
cases of morbid pity, irrational fear, religious enthusiasm, and 
the like, the object which gives expression to these moods is ap- 
j)arently indifferent. Of course it may be replied that the mood 
itself is due to a complex of bodily stimuli (such as those set forth 
in the James-Lange theory of the emotions) and the facts are 
that in all the habitual expressions of the emotions there exist 
certain common an<l definite stimuli discharging themselves into 
the higher centers, and that this second class of habitual re- 
sponses really belongs with the first class, namely, of response to 
identical stimuli. Whether this is the(U'etically true or not, we 
again have, and to a greater extent than in the cases cited under 
the first class, what may be practically considered as a very gen- 
eral res])onse to a large number of different environmental condi- 
tions. 

(3.) We further have in any definite reaction to a given sit- 
uation not merely one elemental adjustment, but generally many 
both ])ositive and negative. This the following discussion will 
attempt to make clear: 

Let us suppose that a child in the school room is being taught 
to correctly form the letter a in his coi>y book. Uere we have the 
exam])le of training in a special habit. We have a certain definite 
stimulus of sight, namely the letter a of the copy book, which con- 
stitutes the essential stimulus to which there is a specific re- 
s])onse, the writing of the letter <i. This gradually becomes more 
and more an habitual process and we have set up a definite habit 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 27 

of stimulus and response. I wish to submit, however, that besides 
this specific stimulus of the written or printed a on the copy book, 
there are other stimuli which constitute the total situation, which 
stimuli might function just as well for copying h, or any other let- 
ter, as a. We have not merely the specific «-copying reaction, but 
we have as well a more general reaction based on the seeing of the 
copy book, the ''feel" of the pen in the hand, etc., which may be 
termed the "copy-book" reaction; beyond this we have a still more 
general group of motor expressions and inhibitions whicli consti- 
tute the "scliool" reaction as such and differentiate it from the 
"home'' reaction, for example. Now, in the copying of the letter a 
all tbese various reactions are involved, but only a very small part 
of the total reaction functions solely for the a-copying habit; mucli 
of it might function equally well for the reading habit, or the num- 
ber-work habit. There is then a considerable part of the r/-copyiug 
habit that is not specific in the sense that it is confined to the one 
particular reaction of copying the a. It is general in the sens(* 
that it concerns itself with many other school activities. For ex 
ample, the ignoring of the noises on the street, the holding of the 
body in the proper position at the desk, etc., are reactions that 
apply to various school situations other than the one concerned 
with the business of copying the (/. 

Perhaps this thought may be made more clear by the accom- 
panying diagram. In this the script letters a, h, y, ^, represent cer- 
tain specific activities in which the i)upil is being trained, a, how- 
ever, involves the more general adjustment W, which in turn in- 
volves the still more general adjustment S. Now while in the 
activity a, W and S are both involved, these may also be involved 
equally well in still other activities. For example, W is involved 
among other things in the activity h, while S is involved not only 
in W, but in R as well. To be more concrete, let us suppose that 
a represents the f/copying habit, and W the writing habit and 
S the school habit, wliile R represents the reading liabit and y the 
hal)it of reading a verse. Now it is quite obvious that in learn- 
ing to copy u, the other higher habits, if they have not already 
been formed, will of necessity gradually be set up. Suppose the 
child should begin his activities in school (which of course, he 
actually would not) by learning to copy the letter a. In this ac- 
tivity he would gradually acquire the more fundamental habit of 
paying attention in the school room and of the general technique 
of learning to write. Thus in learning to copy the a. he would 



28 



UNIVERSITY OP ILLINOIS 



a 







THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 29 

have also acquired a stock of habits which could be transferred to 
other scliool situations. In other words, learning to copy a 
would constitute a general training as well as a specific habit- 
forming activity. 

So we are justified in speaking of general habits of attending, 
or of thinking, or of willing, although as Bagley would urge with 
justice, attention, thought, and resolution are mental states, which 
as highly conscious, raise the individual above the plane of habit- 
ual activities, and make it possible for him to respond in a new 
way to a new situation. The fact, however, that he does attend, 
has tlie attitude of attention, is due to certain specific tendencies 
toward reaction whicli have been gradually acquired and made 
reflex. The attending to the dictation of the teacher, for example, 
brings into the consciousness of the child a situation to which he 
may intelligently react, but the possibility of getting the attitude 
of tliis attention is largely dependent on manj^ subconscious and 
habitual factors, such as ignoring unessential stimuli, disregard- 
ing tedium, and in general having developed a technique of learn- 
ing. These elements have been emphasized by most of the investi- 
gators above cited as essential in the process of transfer. 

If we consider again the diagram just discussed we shall be 
able to see how it explains some of the facts of transfer or its lack, 
as shown in investigations above considered. 

In one of the tests of Thorndike, for example, the subjects 
were given practice in marking the words on a printed page con- 
taining the two letters e and .s*. Before and after this training 
these subjects were tested in marking the words containing other 
combinations of letters, misspelled words, different parts of 
speech, etc. Improvement in the second test series was measured 
by increased speed and accuracj-. In general speed was more 
likely to be improved than accuracy. The reason for this I think 
is perfectly obvious in terms of our diagram, as can be seen from 
the following: Suppose tliat a represents the practice in marking 
the words containing e and s, while h represents the marking of 
words containing the other letters, etc. It is quite obvious that the 
specific marking habit acquired in the first series enters into con- 
flict in a certain sense with the marking of words containing m 
and /, for example, since the attention is turned from words of one 
general make-up in the practice series to those of another com- 
position, in the test series. Thus the acquired tendency to mark 
words containing e and s will actually tend to inhibit the marking 



30 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

of words containing m and /. Hence there may be a falling oft" in 
accuracy. On the other hand, the more general reaction of mark- 
ing words has been trained at the same time as the habit of mark- 
ing specific words. This latter phase of the habit (which Thorn- 
dike would term an identical element, but which I prefer to call 
a more general attitude) may be transferred frcmi the marking of 
one kind of word to the other. This might result in greater speed 
and at the same time diminished accuracy. I venture to say that 
if a subject had been trained to high efficiency in the word-marking 
habit, further training in marking certain specific words would 
tend to exercise a negative influence in marking other words sim- 
ilar to them. The nearer the activities were alike in this case, the 
greater would be the distraction of attention, and the greater the 
falling off in efficiency. 

It would seem probable for this reason that highly trained 
laboratory subjects would show less general effect of training 
than would naive subjects, and that adults would show less ef- 
fect than would children. The laboratory subject who has mas- 
tered the technique of giving himself over to the test at hand, who 
knows how to hold his attention down to the minimum of fluctua- 
tion and to overcome the loss of interest arising through ennui, 
can expect to get little general training in carrying on such a spe- 
cific activity as judging areas, tapping at dots on paper, or learn- 
ing nonsense syllables. The greatest i)Ossibilities of transferring 
general attitudes of attention, thinking, etc., except as conscious 
ideals or purposes, lie, then, with untrained adults and with chil- 
dren, especially' with the latter. This makes the educative pro- 
cess so hopeful where children are concerned and relatively hope- 
less with adults. It is not that adults cannot learn new habits, 
as James maintains in his famous cha])ter on habit; it is that 
they cannot generalize these habits, that nudvcs the man of forty 
an old fogy. 

Transfer of training is then possible in the ways indicated: 
(1) Where a single element to which a specific response is made 
functions under various environmental conditions because it is 
a common element in these various, and otherwise to a greater or 
less degree, dissimilar environments; (2) When a dominant mood 
or emotion so colors various environments that a characteristic 
response is obtained without identity of any objective condition; 
(3) Where a single response in reality involves other and more 
general adjustments; (4) It is also possible, as liagley suggests, 



THE DOGMA OV FORMAL DISCIPLINE 31 

tbrougii making the end of (lie activity a clearly conscious ideal. 
In this ease the transfer takes place b}^ a direct carrying over 
by consciousness not of the activity itself, but of the purpose of 
the activity, to another field. This transfer may be represented 
ia the diagram by the dotted lines from a to h, from a to c, and so 
on, showing a direct transfer without involving the adjustments 
at W, S, or R. To illustrate by a concrete example, the habit of 
attention in school (S) may function quite unconsciously, from 
having been acquired in the reading of poetry (y) ; in connecticm 
with the writing of certain letters in the copj-book (b), or it may 
function rather because the school-attention attitude has been 
made a conscious ideal in connection with y and is therefore car- 
ried over as an end of action rather than as a habit. This general 
sctieme with this modification suggests, I believe, all the possi- 
])ilities of transfer; general moods and attitudes that have grown 
up quite unconsciously as well as developed conscious purposes 
finding their place in the transfer. Whether beyond this there is 
some mysterious sort of harmony, or sympathetic vibration, in 
'.he nervous system that makes it possible for one habit to set 
up another without a transfer in the ways suggested, we do not 
know. But if it exists it is buried at present so far below the 
threshhold of consciousness that it has no practical educational 
significance and need not be considered here. 

V. RULES FOR SECURING TRANSFER. 

The possibility of a general training is thus seemingly estab- 
lished both in theory and in fact, and it becomes the business of 
education to consider how such a training can best be secured. 
I believe that it is possible in the light of all the evidence presented 
on the subject of transfer to lay down with tolerable certainty a 
few rules of procedure. 

(1). The first rule should be: Make those specific activi- 
ties which you wish to transfer the object of thought. Let the 
significance of the habit and its general bearings become known 
to the person who is the subject of the training. Bagley has em- 
phasized this factor in training in his doctrine of transference 
through ideals, and the experiments of Ruediger seem to justify 
the contention. The results of Judd, who, as previously stated, 
has shown that practice with knowledge has a value in the trans- 
fer of training which practice without knowledge does not pos- 



32 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

sess, also point to the same general conclusion. Likewise, IMeu- 
mann has fonnd that it is desirable in training cliihlren formally 
to bring to their attention the significance of such training. It 
further should be said that our knowledge of the functioning of 
the nervous system is in strict accord with this general position in 
regard to transfer, since the association fibres of the cortex are the 
ones which connect various sensory and motor areas and their 
function is probably primarily related to the higher conscious 
processes. 

Tt would seem then that we have a definite means which edu- 
cation can pursue in formal training and this means removes the 
criticism that such training is merely mechanical and deadening. 

(2). Train the child in the technique of learning and in the 
processes that make learning effective and ecQuomical, Nearly 
all the investigations emphasize the value of pro])erly adapted at- 
tention, of satisfactory physical and mental attitudes in securing 
transfer. Sustained attention should be developed in the school 
training, not merely for the sake of the object attended to (per- 
haps not primarily for the object's sake), but rather for the sake 
of attention itself. The whole art of learning should be carefully 
and skillfully controlled. The importance of right methods of 
learning has Ix^eu emphasized in recent years largely through tlie 
work of Meumann. It appears that one of the chief aims of edu- 
cation should be to teach the child how to acquire knowledge Avith 
the least expenditure of time and energy compatible with its re- 
tention for effective use. Personally I am convinced that one of 
the greatest needs of formal training in this connection is the 
development of the child's mental imagery. See to it that chil- 
dren can enifJoy various kinds of imagery effectively, develop 
the imagery for form and for color, the imagery for sounds and 
for kinaesthetic sensation of throat, hand and fingers when pos- 
sible. ]\rany a j)Oor reader cannot visualize, many a child defici- 
ent in nicety of motor control lacks kinaesthetic imagery; all 
draining in iMusical notation is w^orthless knowlelge unless the 
child has fair auditory imagery. 

(3). In seeking to secure transfer, especially where pur- 
pose does not play an important part, see to it that the stimulus 
which is to call forth the desired reaction is such that it may be 
a common element in many objective situations. If, for exam- 
ple, it is desired to promote in general the habit of observation, it 
will be unwise to cultivate this habit in a verv narrow and un- 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 33 

usual field of expwience. Habits of observation may doubtless 
be secured by training the observer to give careful attention to 
objects appearing under the microscope. This training in ob- 
servation will on the whole probably have less possibilities of 
transfer to other fields than will training in observation cultivated 
in the study of more common objects of life, such as those of plants 
and animals that are often met with in the daily environment. 

(4). Education should cultivate through specific training 
general emotional attitudes. Moods and feelings often are the 
dominant elements in a situation and these can readily be trans- 
ferred, I believe. The child who has the proper emotional atti- 
tude toward his school life will be the one v»iio will act most cap- 
ably in the school environment. Education should see to it that 
such general feeling attitudes as docility, respect for authority, 
eagerness tc he of service, and tlie like are developed through the 
school training. Such attitudes, unlike the ideals which Bagley 
emphasizes, need not (perhaps should not) be raised to full con- 
sciousness. This, I believe, has a bearing on the moral instruc- 
ticn in the schools. I have sometimes thought that intellectualiz- 
ing what ought to be an emotional attitude is a dangerous pro- 
cedure. This thought has significance in relation to temperance 
instruction and the like. I think that the question may well be 
raised, — Has not the instruction on the effect of alcohol and nar- 
cotics the tendency to make the child's attitude merely a matter 
of intellect, when it should primarily remain one of feeling and of 
will? 

VI. THE SUPERIOR DISCIPLINARY VALUE OF PURE 
AS COMPARED WITH APPLIED SCIENCE. 

Finally, if it is true that a formal training is possible, and 
if it is desirable that the schools furnish such a training, we come 
back to the old question as to whether there are certain studies 
that are better suited than others to offer this discipline. It 
would .seem probable that there are subjects wliicli either because 
of the nature of their subject matter, or because of the better tech- 
nique that goes with tlieir instruction are today more valuable 
than others from the standpoint of mental training. Other 
studies which are not now so well developed will, perhaps, some 
day take the place of mathematics, or natural science, or foreign 



34 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

language, but today they are less valuable from a disciplinary 
standpoint. 

Just at present the most important controversy concerning 
educational values is being carried on between those who advocate 
tlie advantages of applied science and those who hold to the great- 
er value of pure science. The proper solution of the relative im- 
portance of the two spheres of human knowledge will doubtless 
have much to do with the development of the most valuable cur- 
riculum of studies in our secondary schools and colleges. I am 
inclined to believe that at least as far as mental discipline is 
concerned, pure science has much in its favor as a subject of in- 
struction. In a forthcoming volume, liagley emphasizes the prob- 
able superiority of pure mathematics over applied mathenmtics 
with its utilitarian ends which tend to color every other considera- 
tion; thus obscuring the ideals of accuracy and rigidity that the 
pure science teaches. "Applied mathematics," says Bagley, "will 

inevitably demand quantity rather than quality With the 

better and more intelligent students, the discipline may come in 
spite of haste. With the average student, the longer and more 
penetrating processes from which the perception of the unique 
values of mathenmtical reasoning will emerge, will be omitted.'' 

What is true in regard to pure mathematics as compared 
with applied mathematics is,I believe, true in regard to other 
pure sciences as compared with other applied sciences. The ap- 
plication of a science tends to emphasize certain human values 
more or less remote from the value of the science as science; 
hence, to restrict the field of the inquiry to those phases of the 
science that seem to relate most definitely to economic and other 
more or less narrow human values. With tliis point of view the 
investigator is ai)t not only to lose the ideals of rigidity- wliich 
I>agley ])oints out, but also the ideals of truth merely as truth; 
trutli that is self-sufficient and confident, that knows that wliat- 
ever is true is human and whatever is untrue or partially true can 
never have ultimate worth in human experience. This ideal 
gained in one pure science and made a conscious end of endeavor 
in all fields of human experience has a rich promise for the future. 
The great discoveries of science have been made by those who were 
primarily scientists, who had the scientific ideal. Applied science 
couK's later and uses the knowledge of a Ilelmlioltz playing with 
the o]»tlialmoscope, or a Darwin, in the spirit of scientific curios- 
ity collecting specimens and data from which has developed the 



THE DOGMA OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE 35 

theory of evolution with its countless applications to human life- 
The mere facts of science are worth much; relatively less, however, 
m the first years of study before specialization has begun in the 
technical school or university; but the fact as fact has slight dis- 
ciplinary value unless from it grows the spirit of curiosity, the 
emotional ideal, which the Greeks realized gave birth to all knowl- 
edge, and through which modern education has achieved such re- 
sults. My own conclusions would be that pure science is of greater 
disciplinary value because (1) through the facts which it pre- 
sents, ideal of procedure and of truth may be developed whicii 
function in a wider human experience, greatly to the uplift of the 
race; (2) the content and method of pure science is such that it 
has a broader field of application than has applied science, and can 
function as an identical or similar element in more situations than 
can applied science; (3) the emotion which the pure seeking after 
truth arouse is higher and less likely to be deadened by other emo- 
tions than are the ideals of economic improvement and social bet- 
terment, which are the aims of an applied science. These latter 
are apt to conflict witli each other and to obscure the greater issue. 
Truth has but one aim, to know itself; it has a greater emotional 
uplift and is one of the fundamental passions of tlie human race; 
as fundamental as the economic and social needs, and capable 
of ranges of flight toward the ideal that are denied the other in- 
stinctive longings. 

We must realize that not every subject that has utilitarian 
value, or that excites popular interest, is for that reason solely, 
a fit subject for instruction in the schools. Ultra-conservatism 
has too often insisted on keeping in the curriculum those studies 
that ha\e long since ceased to be vital; on the other hand, we are 
likewise in danger, particularly at the present moment, of going to 
the other and equally fatal extreme. There are so many special 
interests that just now seem to be clamoring for recognition, prac- 
tical, humanitarian, aesthetic, that our scliool programmes are 
in danger of being overcrowded with a variety of subjects which 
cannot well take the place in point of mental training of those 
which have for years been firmly established in tlie curriculum. 
The very multiplicity of the subjects that have enriclied our pro- 
grammes offers a distraction and furnislicM a training in dispersed 
rather than concentrated attention, a training wliich is not needed 
and should not be desired. The trend of popular opinion is such 
ihat the new must come in, and I am far from maintaining that 



36 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

this opinion is not on the whole sound ; but let us see to it that this 
new element is assigned its proper place and given its just value. 
In this time of rapid change we need sanity in educational doc- 
trine and practice as scarcely ever before. 



Hi 



021 339 488 5 ^ 

SCHOOL of EDUCATION 

University of Illinois 

-^ 

The School of Education offers, during the regular University 
year, courses in principles and history of education, school hygiene, 
school law, school administration and supervision, secondary edu- 
cation, social phases of education, comparative education, and 
educational classics. 

Through the Department of Psycliology, it offers courses gen- 
eral, experimental, genetic, and educational psychology. 

In cooperation with other departments of the University, it 
offers courses in the teaching of the ancient and modern languages, 
English, history, the biological and physical sciences. 

In cooperation with the College of Agriculture, it trains teach- 
ers of agriculture and household science for the elementary and 
secondary schools. 

It offers graduate work in the principles and history of edu- 
cation, in school organization and supervision, and in the history 
and organization of industrial education. A secondary school 
enrolling over three hundred pupils is open to properly qualified 
graduate students for purposes of investigating problems of class- 
room teaching and the organization of subject-matter. 

It offers courses in practice-teaching open to students of 
graduate and senior standing, and involving either one or two 
semesters of actual teaching, five hours each week, under compe- 
tent supervision. 

During the Summer Session (June 20th to August 19t]i, 
1910), courses are offered in the principles and theory of educa- 
tion, educational values, high-school administration, general school 
administration, technique of secondary teaching including class 
management, history of industrial education, and (at tlie Biologi- 
cal Station at Havana) courses in elementary and secondary teach- 
ing of biology. 

Address for further information, 

W. C. Bagley, Director, 

Urbana, Illinois. 



